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The FINaNCIaL aCTIoN TaSk ForCe aNd The LegaL ProFeSSIoN
 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established in 1989 by the G7 
nations (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and Canada), 
the European Commission, and eight other countries.1 The FATF was created “to 
adopt and implement measures designed to counter the abuse of the financial system 
by criminals.”2 In 1990, within a year of its inception, the FATF issued the original 
version of its now well-known Forty Recommendations. These recommendations 
were essentially a comprehensive plan of action to fight money laundering.
 In 2001, the FATF expanded its mission to include the fight against terrorist 
financing (combat the financing of terrorism, or CFT). That October, following the 
September 11 terrorist attacks, the FATF adopted eight new Special Recommendations 
to its original forty, and, in 2004, added a ninth Special Recommendation. These new 
Recommendations were sometimes collectively referred to as the 40+9 Recommendations, 
but in February 2012, the FATF consolidated the 40+9 Recommendations into a 
revised Forty Recommendations, which remain today as the international standards for 
combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Most pertinent to the practice of 
law are Recommendations 22 through 25 regarding customer due diligence and 
transparency-beneficial ownership of legal persons or arrangements.
 As of April 2014, the FATF is composed of thirty-four member jurisdictions and 
two regional organizations. Delegates to the FATF are not elected, and the FATF has 
no legislative authority. The FATF cannot make law, but member countries voluntarily 
support and are committed to its principles. The FATF makes legislative 
recommendations to its members, countries then respond (or don’t), and the FATF 
monitors and evaluates the implementation of the Forty Recommendations. If members 
fail to enact laws based on the Recommendations, the FATF applies peer pressure 
through a number of mechanisms to encourage and promote the requisite legislation.3
1. History of the FATF, Fin. Action Task Force, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/historyofthefatf/ 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2015). For an exceptional treatment of the history of the Financial Action Task Force 
(FATF) from a U.S. perspective, see Kevin L. Shepherd, Guardians at the Gate: The Gatekeeper Initiative 
and the Risk-Based Approach for Transactional Lawyers, 43 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J. 607 (2009).
2. Paul Vlaanderen, Foreword to Global Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment, Fin. 
Action Task Force 3 (2010), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/
Global%20Threat%20assessment.pdf.
3. The mechanisms used by the FATF include:
In the self-assessment exercise, every member country provides information on the status 
of its implementation of the 40 Recommendations  .  .  . by responding each year to a 
standard questionnaire. This information is then compiled and analyzed, and provides the 
basis for assessing the extent to which the Recommendations have been implemented by 
both individual countries and the group as a whole. The second element for monitoring the 
implementation of the 40 Recommendations is the mutual evaluation process. Each 
member country is examined in turn by the FATF and MONEYVAL on the basis of an 
on-site visit conducted by a team of selected experts in the legal, financial and law 
enforcement fields from other member governments. The purpose of the visit is to draw up 
a report assessing the extent to which the evaluated country has moved forward in 
implementing an effective system to counter money laundering and to highlight areas in 
which further progress may still be required. The mutual evaluation process is enhanced by 
the FATF’s policy for dealing with members not in compliance with the 40 
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 According to the article “Monitoring the Implementation of the Forty 
Recommendations,” the FATF’s policy for handling noncompliant countries includes 
steps such as the following: requiring the noncompliant country to submit a progress 
report; a letter or high-level mission from the president of the FATF to the county 
not in compliance; a statement to financial institutions requesting that special 
attention be given to any transactions involving the noncompliant country; and 
suspending the noncompliant country’s membership in the FATF.4 The FATF also 
has powerful institutional allies in the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund and has suggested that the influence of these organizations will be brought to 
bear against recalcitrant nations worldwide.
 For the past ten years, I along with others—as representatives of The American 
College of Trust and Estate Counsel (ACTEC) and of the American Bar Association 
(ABA)—have engaged with both the FATF and the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury. The Treasury is responsible for carrying out the FATF’s mandates in the 
United States on the subjects of anti-money laundering (AML) and CFT 
recommendations as they affect the practice of law in the United States The decade 
of my involvement coincides with the timeframe in which the FATF has sought to 
extend its mandate from financial institutions to include “designated non-financial 
businesses and professions” (DNFBPs) such as lawyers.5 In this role, I have come to 
the conclusion that the FATF process is deeply f lawed. And while some good has 
come from it, the exercise has been not only biased, but inefficient from a time, 
effort, and cost perspective.
 By sheer coincidence, approximately ten years ago I was a member of a program 
committee charged with putting together a presentation for The International 
Academy of Estate and Trust Law (“Academy”) at its annual meeting in Santa Fe, 
New Mexico. The Academy attempts to have programs that focus on the laws within 
the meeting venue’s jurisdiction. What the program committee quickly learned is 
that three separate and vibrant legal systems hold sway in New Mexico: indigenous 
Native American laws, civil law via Mexico and Spain, and common law from the 
Recommendations. The measures contained in this policy represent a graduated approach 
aimed at reinforcing peer pressure on member governments to take action to tighten their 
anti-money laundering systems.
 European Union Comm., Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism, 19th Report of 2008–2009 
Sess. (Vol. II), at 110 (2009).
4. Fin. Action Task Force, Third Round of AML/CFT Mutual Evaluations: Process and 
Procedures 14 (2009), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/process%20
and%20procedures.pdf.
5. See Fin. Action Task Force, The FATF Recommendations 19–20 (2012), available at http://www.
fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (A decade 
after the creation of the FATF, Recommendation 22 sought to enlist the support of so-called 
“gatekeepers” to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. “Gatekeepers” include certain 
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs) such as lawyers, notaries, trust and 
company service providers (TCSPs), real estate agents, accountants, and auditors who assist with 
transactions involving the movement of money in the domestic and international financial systems. 
This effort is known as the “Gatekeeper Initiative.”).
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United Kingdom. Furthermore, these three regimes do not peacefully co-exist, do 
not fit neatly together, and produce constant tensions in their interactions.6
 Similar dysfunctionality is at work in the FATF process where a clash between 
civil law and common law jurisprudence is playing out in the FATF’s operations. 
The roles that lawyers and notaries play in civil law systems do not parallel the roles 
their counterparts play in common law regimes. As a general matter, civil law 
practitioners and notaries are considered facilitators and functionaries integral to the 
operation of the legal process, as opposed to the more independent role that lawyers 
typically play in common law countries. Again, as a generalization (but not an 
overstatement), the role of the lawyer as an independent actor in the legal system is 
more fundamental to common law jurisdictions.
 In this regard, the FATF’s grouping of DNFBPs is both odd and telling. This 
broad category cavalierly lumps lawyers together with businesses, such as casinos and 
dealers in precious metals and stones. Such a peculiar and circumscribed view of the 
role of lawyers in society could only be produced by a mindset that perceives lawyers as 
simply one more commercial trade in need of AML and CFT regulation, with no 
special considerations. However, if the FATF has its way and continues to ignore the 
unique role of lawyers as guardians of the personal freedoms, liberties, and protections 
to which citizens are entitled, some of those protections (such as the attorney-client 
privilege and the duties of loyalty and confidentiality owed by lawyers to their clients) 
will be marginalized.
 As matters presently stand in the United States under the FATF Recommendations, 
lawyers are not required to report suspicious client activities of relevant information 
obtained in circumstances of “professional secrecy or legal professional privilege.” 
However, the FATF’s reluctance to distinguish the role of lawyers in society from the 
roles of other professionals is pushing the FATF in the direction of broader application of 
simplified due diligence, suspicious activity reporting, and suspicious transaction 
reporting requirements for lawyers. This trend, in turn, threatens the integrity of core 
6. The complexities of these regimes are exhibited in water law, criminal law, civil law on pueblos, and state law.
  Water Law: Where a person owns land on a water system (river) and there are pueblos near or on the 
same system, then the issue as to priority is first in time is first in right. Federal law allows pueblos to claim 
water based upon use of every practicably irrigable acre. See generally Samantha Ruscavage-Barz & Diane 
Albert, Indian Reserved Water Rights, http://dianealbertlaw.com/documents/INDIAN%20RESERVED 
%20WATER%20RIGHTS.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2015). This can mean that pueblo use could consume 
all available water on a stream system or river system. The old Spanish system of first in use (beneficial 
use) is first in time. New Mexico has adopted this approach. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-1-2 (2013).
  Criminal Law: If a crime is committed on a reservation, the federal criminal law applies. 
Misdemeanors on a reservation are managed by pueblo court systems, and state law does not apply. See 
Michael J. Bulzomi, Indian Country and the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, Fed. Bureau Investigation, 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-bulletin/may-2012/indian-country-and-
the-tribal-law-and-order-act-of-2010 (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
  Civil Law on Pueblos: Unless there is a waiver of sovereign immunity by a pueblo (which must be 
done with the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ consent), you must sue in pueblo court and state courts have no 
jurisdiction. If a pueblo Indian conducts business off the reservation, then New Mexico Civil law applies, 
or federal law if you are in federal court. See Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 754 P.2d 845 (N.M. 1988).
  State Law: State law applies to all contracts outside of pueblo exterior boundaries, both civil and 
criminal. Pueblo Indians are subject to state law off the pueblo. 25 U.S.C.§ 1321 (2013).
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principles of the U.S. legal system, including the attorney-client privilege, the duty of 
client confidentiality, the duty of client loyalty, the independence of lawyers, and the 
historical prerogative of state regulation of lawyers—not to mention the Sixth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution, which ensures the right to counsel in criminal cases.
 Lawyers are bound by ethical rules controlling their professional activities. The 
ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”) have been adopted by 
forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (with 
modifications in some cases). The ABA believes that the intersection of the practice 
of law with matters of AML and CFT is already properly defined by the Model 
Rules and the Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and 
Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (“Good Practices Guidance”), 
and that they are more than sufficient to help lawyers avoid unwitting assistance to 
unlawful activities, such as money laundering and terrorist financing. On May 23, 
2013, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility 
issued Formal Opinion 463: Client Due Diligence, Money Laundering, and Terrorist 
Financing on this subject. Formal Opinion 463 concludes that by implementing the 
Good Practices Guidance, lawyers can avoid aiding illegal activities in a manner 
consistent with the Model Rules. Further, it indirectly suggests that certain aspects 
of the FATF’s proposals to regulate lawyers as “gatekeepers” to the financial system 
may be inconsistent with the Model Rules.
 To date, the approach to engaging lawyers in the fight against money laundering 
has been risk-based, has avoided the filing of suspicious activity reports, and has 
been voluntary. To continue in these directions—and to blunt the rules-based trend 
of thinking currently evident at the G8, the FATF, and in some corners of Congress 
and the White House—the acceptance of the Good Practices Guidance by lawyers 
in the United States needs to be enthusiastic and participatory. Anything less by 
lawyers and their organizations may well result in burdensome federal regulation of 
the legal profession.
 Contrast the FATF’s DNFBP mindset with the much broader and more 
fundamental lawyer role recently underscored in a Canadian appellate court decision. 
The Canadian Court of Appeal for British Columbia recently held unconstitutional 
laws that applied AML and CFT obligations to lawyers. While acknowledging the 
importance of the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing, the court 
held that the application of that specific Canadian legislation to lawyers violated the 
liberties guaranteed under Canadian constitutional law.7
 While the case was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada,8 it is the appellate 
court’s language that resonates: The independence of the bar “is fundamental to the 
way in which the legal system ought to operate.” Regulation of the bar must be 
designed to protect the legal profession from state interference. “The public interest 
in a free society knows no area more sensitive than the independence, impartiality, 
7. Fed’n of Law Societies of Can. v. Canada, 2013 BCCA 147.
8. Fed’n of Law Societies of Can. v. Canada, 2015 S.C.C. 7.
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and availability to the general public of the members of the bar and through those 
members, legal advice, and services generally.”9
 This decision well articulates a philosophy that seeks to protect the liberty 
interests of the attorney and the client. This independence of lawyers and the duties 
owed to citizens are inherent aspects of a free and democratic system. However, such 
wide-ranging notions of the lawyer’s role are not endemic to civil law systems.
 Another factor in the clash of systems stems from the formation and operation of 
European Union jurisprudence. The EU itself states:
The EU is a unique economic and political partnership between 28 European 
countries that together cover much of the continent. . . . The EU is based on 
the rule of law: everything that it does is founded on treaties, voluntarily and 
democratically agreed by all member countries. These binding agreements set 
out the EU’s goals in its many areas of activity.10
 The consequence of these goals and principles is necessarily a sacrifice of national 
sovereignty, but it seems also to have led to a collective willingness to acquiesce to the 
recommendations or actions of any international body without meaningful dissent.
 There is significant overlap of membership between the EU member countries 
and the FATF member countries. Therefore, the bureaucratic attitude of deference 
to international organizations is consistent between the two. Indeed, most FATF 
member countries have accepted, without challenge, the Forty Recommendations, 
even in the face of well-reasoned assertions that some of the Recommendations are 
not supported by empirical evidence.11
 Another challenge for those coming from civil law countries is the lack of trust 
law jurisprudence in civil law systems. As common law practitioners know, a trust is 
not an entity—it is a relationship. This concept is completely foreign to civil law and 
its practitioners and, for many of them, it is impossible to comprehend. The FATF 
delegates from civil law countries appear not to understand the separation of legal and 
equitable title, and they typically encounter trusts only in the context of tax evasion.
 Indeed, the FATF’s Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing describes the following services as high risk for 
money laundering abuses: “Services that inherently have provided more anonymity or 
9. Robert C. Lawrence, III & Margaret Van Houten, Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing 
Laws Not Applicable to Canadian Lawyers and Law Firms, Am. C. Tr. & Est. Counsel (2013), http://
www.actec.org/public/FATF_Whitepaper_Anti_Money_Laundering_Laws_Not_Applicable_to_
Canadian_Lawyers.asp#_ftn1 (quoting Canada v. Law Soc’y of B.C., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, 336 (Can.)).
10. How the EU Works, Eur. Union, http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2015).
11. The author knows of four cases, two in France and two in Belgium, where lawyers contested the FATF 
Recommendations: (1) Michaud v. France, App. No. 12323/11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2012); (2) Conseil d’État 
[CE] [highest administrative court] decision No. 296845,29690, Apr. 10, 2008, http://www.conseil-
etat.fr (Fr.); (3) Cour Constitutionnelle [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 91/308, June 26, 
2007, http://www.const-court.be (Belg.); and (4) Cour Constitutionnelle [CC] [Constitutional Court] 
decision No. 10/2008, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.const-court.be (Belg.).
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can readily cross international borders, such as online banking, stored value cards, 
international wire transfers, private investment companies and trusts.”12
 This bald assertion is simply untrue. While there might be a certain ambiguity or 
anonymity with respect to trust beneficiaries, that is the exception—not the rule. And 
there is certainly no ambiguity or anonymity regarding the trustee, i.e., the named 
party who controls the trust assets. In addition, the notion that trusts can “readily cross 
international borders” is patently false, as anyone who has tried to migrate a trust to 
another jurisdiction knows full well. Finally, this grouping of trusts with such things as 
“stored value cards” is as anomalous as the previously mentioned grouping of lawyers 
with casinos. Both groupings ref lect dichotomies in fundamental comprehension; 
trusts, and not stored value cards, are used as estate planning tools, just as lawyers, and 
not casinos, serve to protect our citizens’ freedoms and liberties.
 This conclusion by the FATF that trusts are high risk has not been supported by 
evidence, or even one real life example. Nevertheless, the FATF has pushed hard for 
the engagement of trust lawyers in their processes, has recommended that trust 
lawyers be subjected to onerous obligations, and has been successful in persuading 
the European Parliament to pass legislation to require member states to implement 
public registries of trusts.
 While ACTEC was invited to assist the FATF with trust issues, its voice was 
ultimately ignored. Efforts by ACTEC to address these misunderstandings were to 
no avail. For example, the following is an Interpretive Note by the FATF to 
Recommendation 25: “Countries should require trustees of any express trust governed 
under their law to obtain and hold adequate, accurate, and current beneficial 
ownership information regarding the trust.”
 That language was discussed at a meeting convened by the FATF with the 
private sector in Milan in December of 2011.13 Trust lawyers argued for revisions to 
the then-proposed Interpretive Note to make clear that the focus of compliance and 
enforcement should be on the jurisdiction where the trustee is located. Under trust 
law, the only way to achieve meaningful compliance results is to put the burden on 
the country with jurisdiction over the trustee, not the country whose governing law 
has been selected for the trust, since the latter country would likely have no knowledge 
that the trust even exists.
 The following example was offered. Assume a trust is created by a New Zealand 
resident, with a New Zealand trustee, and funded with New Zealand assets, but the 
settlor selects Delaware as the governing law for the trust. Under the FATF approach, 
since Delaware is the governing law of the trust, the compliance burden would be 
12. Fin. Action Task Force, Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing: High Level Principles and Procedures 24 (June 2007), 
available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/High%20Level%20Principles%20
and%20Procedures.pdf.
13. Memorandum from Kevin L. Shepherd, Partner, Venable LLP, summarizing a Fin. Action Task Force 
Private Sector Meeting held on Dec. 5–6, 2011 in Milan, It. to Am. Bar Ass’n Task Force on Gatekeeper 
Regulation & the Profession; William H. Clark Jr., Partner, Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP; R. Larson 
Frisby, Am. Bar Ass’n Assoc. Dir. of Governmental Affairs; and Duncan E. Osborne, Partner, Osborne, 
Helman, Knebel & Scott LLP (Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with author).
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placed on the United States (via Delaware) even though there is no way that either 
the United States or Delaware would know what had been done in New Zealand. 
This self-evident point was ignored by the FATF, and I advocated that the issue be 
addressed before the language of the Interpretive Note became final.
 The above example is all too typical. The FATF’s staging of private sector 
consultations has been in many aspects a charade. There is the appearance of an 
interactive forum and a meaningful exchange of ideas, but in all too many cases the 
FATF has already choreographed and scripted its positions, which are not altered in 
the consultation process. Agendas and discussions are preset and are not changed no 
matter how compelling the arguments. No substantive dialogue ensues at these 
meetings—and debate is hollow.
 Another example of misguided thinking is the FATF’s perception that lawyers 
are a significant part of the money laundering and terrorist financing problem. In the 
face of persistent requests for examples of lawyer involvement in money laundering 
and terrorist financing schemes, the FATF ultimately produced a Typologies Report 
in which nearly all evidence of lawyer participation was knowing and intentional 
involvement, i.e., lawyers committed to a criminal enterprise.14 Nevertheless, the 
FATF proposes to regulate the vast body of law-abiding lawyers in order to abate the 
actions of a handful of lawyers who certainly will not be paying any attention to the 
FATF as they deliberately, intentionally, and knowingly commit money laundering 
and terrorist financing crimes. Thus, there is no connection between the problem 
the FATF diagnoses and the cure it prescribes. A cynic might conclude that the 
FATF’s real motive is not to regulate lawyers, but rather to have them serve as 
detectives and reporters for law enforcement.
 Lawyers engaged in the FATF process have, however, acknowledged a real risk 
of a law-abiding attorney becoming unwittingly involved in a money laundering or 
terrorist financing scheme. Since the FATF had no examples of such activity, lawyer 
groups have independently embarked on an effort to produce such typologies.15
 On yet another front, the FATF is part of the apparently universal chorus calling 
for “transparency” in all things legal while demonstrating a stubborn unwillingness to 
question the goal of transparency or to consider logical conditions or restraints on 
transparency. For the FATF, apparently, every person and every legal entity or 
arrangement must reside in a glass house. Forgotten is the fact that very valid reasons 
for personal and professional privacy exist. In the business world, trade secrets and 
business plans often depend on confidentiality. In our highly competitive society, 
businesses and professions may fail or succeed depending on the sanctity of information.
14. See generally Fin. Action Task Force, Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
Vulnerabilities of Legal Professionals (June 2013), available at www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/reports/ML%20and%20TF%20vulnerabilities%20legal%20professionals.pdf; see also Int’l 
Bar Ass’n, Am. Bar Ass’n, & Council of Bars & Law Societies of Eur., A Lawyer’s Guide to 
Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering (Oct. 2014) [hereinafter Lawyer’s Guide], 
available at http://www.actec.org/public/Documents/A-Lawyers-Guide-to-Detecting-and-Preventing- 
Money-Laundering-October-2014.pdf.
15. Lawyer’s Guide, supra note 14.
429
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 59 | 2014/15
 On the personal front, an individual’s desire for privacy can stem from personal 
and practical sources. Certainly concerns about kidnapping, personal safety, and 
identity theft are valid. A person can have understandable and reasonable goals 
regarding: (1) his profile or visibility in a community; (2) confidentiality in 
relationships; (3) solicitations, charitable and noncharitable; and (4) sensitive estate 
planning goals accomplished through trusts. The runaway race to transparency 
tramples heedlessly over these legitimate objectives and, while the FATF gives an 
obligatory nod to privacy and individual rights, there is no meaningful effort to 
balance the competing goals of individual privacy and legal transparency.
 Finally, and most compelling, history is filled with an ever-enduring abuse of 
citizens by governments. Examples are legion, and who is to say that the result of 
this blind devotion to the icon of transparency without thought, scrutiny, or balance 
cannot lead to another round of governments abusing citizens?
 In my view, the efforts of the FATF exercise have been neither effective nor cost 
efficient. To the contrary, those efforts are moving us in the direction of serious 
infringements on individual liberties and costly burdens on financial institutions and 
DNFBPs. I am not alone in this conclusion.
 On January 30, 2014, the Center on Law and Globalization issued its paper 
“Global Surveillance of Dirty Money: Assessing Assessments of Regions to Control 
Money-Laundering and Combat the Financing of Terrorism.” This study concludes 
that there has been no serious effort to assess the costs versus the benefits of the 
FATF system, and the entire effectiveness of the FATF work is called into question.
 On February 6, 2014, Gregory J. Millman of the Wall Street Journal stated:
Anti-money laundering efforts by the International Monetary Fund and the 
Financial Action Task Force have built a “Potemkin village” and a “paper 
reality” based on “a plausible fold theory” rather than data and evidence of 
what works, co-authors of a new, independent report said in interviews with 
Risk & Compliance Journal. The report had the cooperation of IMF and 
FATF officials and examined the third round of country assessments for anti-
money laundering, conducted in the 2003-2012 period. “We find that the 
current system is pervasive and highly intrusive but without any evidence as 
to tangible effect,” said Terence C. Halliday, co-director of the Center on 
Law and Globalization.16
 While I have been quite critical of the FATF and its processes, there have been 
some benefits from the overall FATF effort. As a result of extensive and somewhat 
heated arguments by lawyers, the FATF ultimately agreed to develop separate 
templates for the various DNFBPs. The FATF had originally proposed a single, 
monolithic guidance for all DNFBPs, such as guidance that attempted to regulate 
lawyers and, for example, dealers in precious metals and stones, in exactly the same 
way. The lack of wisdom in that approach was finally recognized, and the FATF 
gave up on its one-size-fits-all model. Eventually, in October 2008, the FATF 
16. Gregory J. Millman, The Morning Risk Report: The Potemkin Village of Anti-Money Laundering, Wall 
St. J. Risk & Compliance J. (Feb. 6, 2014, 6:23 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/02/06/
the-morning-risk-report-the-potemkin-village-of-anti-money-laundering/.
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adopted the Risk Based Approach Guidance for Legal Professionals (“2008 RBA”). 
While this was certainly a positive development, the FATF subsequently initiated a 
process of updates to the risk-based guidance documents for the private sector. It is 
possible that the gains achieved in the 2008 RBA may be swept away under the 
guise of revisions. A case in point is the treatment of lawyers filing suspicious activity 
reports on their clients. This concept was appropriately addressed in the 2008 RBA, 
but is now apparently back on the table for discussion.
 Another welcomed side effect of the FATF exercise is the previously mentioned 
Good Practices Guidance. Departing from the 2008 RBA, this Guidance was 
produced by a collaborative effort of representatives of the ABA Task Force on 
Gatekeeper Regulation and Profession, the ABA Section of Real Property, Trust 
and Estate Law, the ABA Section of International Law, the ABA Section of Business 
Law, the ABA Section of Taxation, the ABA Criminal Justice Section, ACTEC, 
the American College of Real Estate Lawyers, the American College of Mortgage 
Attorneys, and the American College of Commercial Finance Lawyers. Ultimately 
the U.S. Treasury Department endorsed the document:
The Treasury Department welcomes this Good Practices paper as a useful 
step in protecting the legal profession as well as the broader financial system 
from the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing. Treasury looks 
forward to continuing engagement with the ABA to facilitate implementation 
of effective policies and procedures to protect against money laundering and 
terrorist financing.17
 I would interject here that the interactions with officials from the Treasury 
Department have differed markedly from those with the FATF bureaucrats. Treasury 
personnel have certainly not always agreed with representatives of the U.S. legal 
profession, but their communications have been open, rational, and reasoned. These 
substantive and meaningful dialogues have helped all parties find common ground 
and avenues for progress in the areas of AML and CFT.18
 The Good Practices Guidance and seminars related to its dissemination have 
alerted lawyers to real life money laundering issues, precautionary measures, and the 
appropriate responses thereto. Lawyers have been—and are being educated about—
money laundering and terrorist financing risks, the greatest of which is unintentionally 
allowing illicit funds to f low through a law firm trust account or client account.
 Another positive result of the FATF process has been the issuance of Formal 
Opinion 463, discussed above.19 The Opinion is important because it harmonizes the 
17. Am. Bar Ass’n, Voluntary Good Practices Guidance for Lawyers to Detect and Combat 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/annual/pdfs/116.authcheckdam.pdf.
18. Special recognition goes to Sarah Runge, Director, Office of Strategic Policy, Terrorist Financing and 
Financial Crimes; Michael Rosen, Policy Advisor, Office of Strategic Policy, Terrorist Financing and 
Financial Crimes; and Gary Sutton, Office of General Counsel, Senior Legal Advisor for Financial 
Crimes.
19. Kevin L. Shepherd, Ethically Speaking . . . Just What Are My Obligations Under the Gatekeeper Initiative?, 
27 Prob. & Prop. Mag. 43 (Sept./Oct. 2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
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Guidance and the Model Rules. By adopting client intake and monitoring procedures, 
lawyers can ensure that they do not unwittingly provide legal services which facilitate 
money laundering or terrorist financing, and they can do so in ways that are consistent 
with ethical principles of loyalty and confidentiality.
 The Opinion makes clear that, (1) the Model Rules do not mandate that lawyers 
perform a gatekeeper role in deterring their clients from engaging in wrongdoing; 
and (2) the filing of a suspicious activity report would run afoul of the Model Rules. 
The Opinion underscores the fundamental point in the Model Rules that a lawyer 
cannot knowingly counsel or assist a client to commit a crime or fraud.
 In conclusion, it is my opinion that the FATF has been given an unsupervised 
and unmonitored license to address AML and CFT problems, and that the FATF 
has done so without thoughtfully considering the merits of its arguments and 
pronouncements, without any consideration whatsoever to costs, without meaningful 
engagement of the private sector, and with a willful obliviousness to both the reality 
and practical consequences of its work.
 Along with a fine group of other U.S. lawyers, I have devoted many hours to this 
struggle with the FATF and its ill-considered encroachments against the role of the 
lawyer in the common law system. On the rare occasion I need reminding why I am 
doing so, I simply recall the words of Pericles: “Freedom is the sure possession of 
those alone who have the courage to defend it.” I stay engaged in this process because 
of the risks to individual freedom and liberties at stake.
probate_property_magazine_2012/2013/september_october_2013/2013_aba_rpte_pp_v27_5_article_
shephert_gatekeeper_initiative.html.
